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The seas have always proved an extraordinary resource for the limited
number of communities having access to them.' Although in modem
times the seas have been considered a resource available for the use of all
nations and the exclusive property of none,2 the recent history of the law
of the sea continues to reflect conflicts between states seeking un-
hampered navigation and utilization of resources and other states seeking
exclusive control over adjacent seas.3 The international law of the sea
seeks to moderate these competing interests by "establishing and main-
taining a public order in the shared use of, and shared competence over,
the oceans. '
4
A major event in the history of the international law of the sea oc-
curred on April 30, 1982, with the adoption of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea5 during the eleventh and final session of
the Third Conference at United Nations headquarters in New York.
6
The Convention, which represents the culmination of nine years of inten-
sive effort,7 is particularly significant for its comprehensiveness." Virtu-
ally every human use of the oceans-navigation and overflight, resource
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1. McNees, Freedom of Transit Through International Straits, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 175,
176 (1975).
2. Id. at 177, quoting thefollowing enunciation of the rule by Lord Stowell in 1817: "All
nations have an equal right to the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation."
(citing J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 64 (6th ed. 1967)).
3. Shelton & Rose, Freedom of Navigation: The Emerging International Regime, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 523 (1977).
4. McDougal & Burke, The Community Interest in a Narrow Territorial Sea. Inclusive
Versus Exclusive Competence Over the Oceans, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 171 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Community Interest].
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
6. United Nations Press Release, U.N. Doc. SEA/494 (Apr. 30, 1982) at 1 [hereinafter
cited as U.N. Press Release]. See Allott, Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1, 4 (1983).
7. U.N. Press Release, supra note 6.
8. Allott, supra note 6, at 8.
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exploration and exploitation, conservation and pollution, fishing and
shipping-is addressed in the Convention's 320 articles and nine an-
nexes.9 Whether the new Convention becomes a formally ratified
treaty,10 its very existence "modifies political, economic and legal rela-
tionships in countless ways whose direction and intensity we can predict
only in a most speculative way."11
This Comment examines the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOS Convention) as it affects two basic issues: (1) the right of
passage in the territorial sea12 or "innocent passage," and (2) the right of
passage through straits used for international navigation, or "transit
passage."
The primary conflict relevant to analysis of ocean passage involves the
security interests of coastal states and the navigational interests of mari-
time states.13 The most exclusive14 claims advanced by coastal states are
those that seek to protect or limit access to "internal" or "territorial"
waters immediately adjacent to the state,15 and those that seek to extend
the reach of state sovereignty over these waters.16 These nations justify
their demands in terms of economic necessity in order to preserve petro-
leum and mineral resources, to protect fishing interests, and to prevent
9. U.N. Press Release, supra note 6.
10. The Convention shall enter into force of law 12 months after the date of deposit of the
sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary General of the United Na-
tions. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 306 & 308(1).
11. Allott, supra note 6.
12. The sea is generally divided into three zones-high seas, internal waters, and territorial
sea. These zones and the concomitant rights of vessels passing through them have been de-
scribed as follows:
The 'high seas' are beyond the coastal State's jurisdiction and there all States enjoy the
'freedom of the seas' . .. including the freedom of navigation and overflight. At the
other extreme are the 'internal waters' of the State, consisting of its harbours, ports and
roadsteads, and of its interior gulfs and bays, straits, lakes and rivers. In general, they
include all waters to landward of the low waterline or the established baseline. On these
waters, apart from where special treaties apply and where waters were formerly territorial
prior to the application of the principle of straight baselines, foreign States cannot demand
any rights for their ships and aircraft. Between these two extremes lies the 'territorial sea'
acknowledged to be the territory of the State whose coasts it washes. Here no foreign
State may overfly but its ships may pass 'upon their lawful occasions' or in 'innocent
passage.' This right to access by ships of other States may be looked upon as a servitude
over the territorial waters.
McNees, supra note 1, at 180-81.
13. Id. at 187. The term "maritime states" signifies those nations "whose merchant and
naval ships make more than localized use of the seas." Id.
14. Exclusive interests are interests in those activities "which predominantly affect only
one territorial community." McDougal, The Law of the High Seas in Time of Peace, 3 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 45, 49 (1973).
15. See McNees, supra note 1, at 180-81.
16. Id. at 187-88.
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pollution in their adjacent waters. 17
The most inclusive' claims, by contrast, are those often advanced by
maritime nations, whose interests are best served by maximum freedom
of access to the oceans for transportation, communication, military pur-
poses, and the production and exchange of raw materials and goods. 19
Maritime nations view these policies as advantageous to their own inter-
ests as well as to those of the larger world community.20 The LOS Con-
vention represents the latest attempt to strike a balance between the
interests of coastal states and maritime states through the regimes of in-
nocent passage and transit passage.
I. Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea
Innocent passage signifies a right of free passage through territorial
waters which exists only as long as the foreign vessel respects coastal
state regulations and does not interfere with or threaten the tranquility of
the coastal state.
21
All claims by coastal states with regard to the territorial sea involve
two conflicting policies. One is the interest of the general community in
maintaining the oceans as a common resource for transportation and
communication, free from undue coastal restraint.22 The competing pol-
icy is the recognition of the competence of the coastal state to promote
and protect its interests by exercising authority over passage through its
territorial sea.
23
The purpose of the doctrine of innocent passage is to reach a compro-
mise between these conflicting policies. The common, inclusive interest
in assuring full and efficient use of the oceans is represented by the guar-
antee of freedom of passage, while the exclusive interest in protecting
coastal state values is protected by the qualification that passage must be
"innocent," that is, not offensive to certain coastal interests.24 In ap-
praising claims and counterclaims relating to passage in the territorial
17. Id. at 188.
18. Inclusive interests are interests in those activities which "have significant transnational
effects, that is, which importantly affect more than one territorial community." McDougal,
supra note 14.
19. See Burke, Contemporary Law of the Sea: Transportation, Communication and Flight,
2 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 183, 189-90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary
Law].
20. See McNees, supra note 1, at 188-89.
21. Smith, The Politics of Lawmaking: Problems in International Maritime Regulation-
Innocent Passage v. Free Transit, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 487, 503-04 (1976).
22. M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 184-85 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as PUBLIC ORDER].
23. Id. at 185.
24. Id.
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sea, the major problem has been to determine what is a reasonable intru-
sion.25 Reconciling these competing interests involves the complex ques-
tion of the extent of the territorial sea. Nations have not yet agreed upon
a common limit for territorial waters.
26
During the nineteenth century, the right of the coastal state to exert
jurisdiction over a three-mile territorial sea gained widespread accept-
ance through the customary practices of nations and subsequent codifica-
tion in statutes and treaties.27 This recognition initially stemmed from
demands by coastal states for authority to protect their boundaries up to
a distance measured by a cannon shot.28
Since about 1960, a substantial majority of coastal nations has aban-
doned this traditional boundary and has claimed a territorial sea of
twelve miles.29 Even the United States, which had supported a three-
mile rule since 1793, more recently has accepted a jurisdiction of twelve
miles for certain limited purposes.30
In the past several decades, a small group of Latin American nations
has asserted what is, in effect, exclusive sovereignty over coastal seas to a
distance of 200 miles.31 These nations desire to maintain control over the
living resources of the sea upon which their economies depend for com-
modities in international trade and as a means of livelihood and nourish-
ment for their citizens.32
Despite these extreme claims, which favor special interests and jeop-
ardize the full sharing of ocean resources, 33 the most recognizable mod-
em trend has been the acceptance of a twelve-mile territorial sea.34 The
practical effect of this policy, however, is to place considerably greater
expanses of waters, formerly governed by unrestricted high seas free-
doms, under the more intrusive regime of innocent passage.
The balance struck by the LOS Convention among the competing in-
25. Id.
26. Comment, Territorial Waters-Ownership and Control, 8 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L.
240, 242 (1976).
27. Community Interest, supra note 4, at 229; Comment, supra note 26, at 242.
28. Community Interest, supra note 4, at 229; Comment, supra note 26, at 241.
29. Martinez, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Prospects, Ex-
pectations, and Realities, 7 . MAR. L. & CoM. 253, 255 & n.7 (1975).
30. Comment, supra note 26, at 243. This shift was manifested in the proclamation of an
exclusive fishing zone in 1965, Martinez, supra note 29, at 256; and in the establishment of a
coastal zone for the testing of nuclear weapons by treaty in 1971, Comment, supra note 26, at
243.
31. Martinez, supra note 29, at 260. See also Burke, Submerged Passage Through Straits:
Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text, 52 WAsH. L. REv. 193, 195 n. 10
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Submerged Passage].
32. McNees, supra note 1, at 188.
33. See Community Interest, supra note 4, at 175.
34. See Martinez, supra note 29, at 255.
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terests varies with the nature of the ship in question. The LOS Conven-
tion contains provisions applicable to all ships as well as provisions
applicable only to commercial vessels. A final set of provisions covers
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes.
A. Prescriptions Applicable to All Ships
As in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone (1958 Geneva Convention),35 the provisions of the LOS
Convention relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea ap-
pear under Part II, Section 3.36 Subsection A, "Rules Applicable to All
Ships," refers to "ships" without distinction as to their character.37 Ar-
ticle 19 of the new agreement, in language identical to that of the 1958
Geneva Convention, defines innocent passage as that which is "not preju-
dicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State."' 38 The
article enumerates a dozen acts of the transiting vessel which would be
considered "prejudicial" to the coastal state. This is a significant depar-
ture from the 1958 Geneva Convention, which was essentially subjective
and made no specific reference to activities that were prejudicial.39 The
broadest category is phrased as "any other activity not having a direct
bearing on passage." 4° The purpose of the revision was to specify those
activities that are prejudicial to coastal interests, while retaining the flexi-
ble notions of peace, good order, and security.41 Debate at the LOS Con-
ference primarily concerned whether such specifications should be
exhaustive (as espoused by maritime nations such as the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom) or open-ended and merely illustrative (as
urged by "strait states" such a Fiji).42
Article 20 provides that "submarines and other underwater vehicles"
must navigate on the surface and show their flags in the territorial sea, a
position which represents no significant change from the 1958 Geneva
Convention.43
35. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Continguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Geneva Convention].
36. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 17-26.
37. See Maduro, Passage Through International Straits" The Prospects Emerging From the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 85 (1980).
38. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(1).
39. See Maduro, supra note 37, at 77 n.43.
40. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(2)(1) (emphasis added),
41. Contemporary Law, supra note 19, at 226.
42. Id. at 226-27.
43. Article 14, para. 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention refers only to "submarines,"
whereas the LOS Convention adds "and other underwater vehicles," no doubt in response to
technological and scientific developments during the last two decades. See Robertson, Passage
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Article 21 establishes the coastal state's authority to "adopt laws and
regulations" in the following areas: safety of navigation; regulation of
marine traffic; protection of navigational aids and facilities, cables, and
pipelines; conservation of the living resources of the sea; prevention of
infringement of fisheries regulations; preservation of the coastal state's
environment; prevention, reduction, and control of pollution; marine sci-
entific research and hydrographic surveys; and the prevention of infringe-
ment of the state's customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations.44
This represents a significant expansion over the 1958 treaty, which con-
tained specific mention of coastal state authority only regarding trans-
port, navigation, and the prohibition of fishing.45 However, the LOS
Convention specifies that such regulations "shall not apply to the design,
construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giv-
ing effect to generally-accepted international rules or standards. '46 For-
eign ships exercising the right of innocent passage are directed to comply
with all such regulations as well as with accepted international law on
the prevention of collisions.47
In response to coastal state concerns regarding accidents and pollution
in adjacent seas,48 Article 22 provides that the coastal state may pre-
scribe, "where necessary and having regard to the safety of navigation,"
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes for the passage of ships. The
negotiations concerning Article 22 reveal that the grant of authority to
coastal states to create sea lanes was preferable to the more intrusive
grant of competence to regulate the design, construction, manning, or
equipment of ships, which, it was believed, would inhibit the shipbuilding
industry and commerce in general, 49 and which is therefore essentially
forbidden.50
Article 25 grants to the coastal state the right temporarily to suspend
innocent passage in its territorial waters, provided such suspension is
without discrimination among foreign ships and is essential for the pro-
tection of security.
Through International Straits: A Right Preserved in the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 801, 802 n.5 (1980).
44. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 21(1).
45. Maduro, supra note 37, at 78.
46. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 21(2).
47. Id. art. 21(4).
48. For a detailed discussion of marine pollution problems, see generally Fleischer, Pollu-
tionfrom Seaborne Sources, 3 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 78 (1973); Hardy,
Definition and Forms of Marine Pollution, 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 73
(1973).
49. Smith, supra note 21, at 542.
50. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 21.
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Article 19's comprehensive enumeration apparently encompasses
nearly every situation which might present a threat of harm to the
coastal state.51 In the area of environmental protection, however, the
LOS Convention provides that where pollution occurs, only an act of
"wilful and serious pollution" will be considered prejudicial per se.52
Presumably, pollution caused by accident, negligence, poor standards of
construction or seamanship, or by any other unintentional cause would
be regarded as "innocent" under the LOS Convention.5 3 This result is
surely undesirable.
Some commentators have argued that, despite the detailed enumera-
tion, the new definition of innocent passage gives the coastal states en-
tirely too much latitude to determine "prejudice" subjectively.54 For
instance, almost any passage by a military vehicle may be regarded as
threatening to the coastal state, and thus prejudicial under Article
19(2)(a), due to the "symbolic" or "flag-showing" message communi-
cated.55 Moreover, the broad language holding prejudicial "any other
activity not having a direct bearing on passage" provides even greater
discretion for coastal states to characterize passage as "non-innocent.
'5 6
Finally, the provision in Article 19(2)(a) permitting the coastal state to
consider violations of "principles of international law enbodied in the
Charter of the United Nations" when assessing prejudice arguably grants
undue discretion to the coastal states.57 Many of the Charter principles
were framed at high levels of generality and discretion, with the expecta-
tion that they would be applied by United Nations organs according to
Charter procedures.
58
51. These prejudicial activities are as follows: any threat or use of force against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the coastal state, or in any other man-
ner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations; any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; any act aimed at collecting infor-
mation to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state; any act of propaganda
aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal state; the launching, landing, or taking
on board of any aircraft; the launching, landing, or taking on board of any military device; the
loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary regulations of the coastal state; any act of wilful and serious pollution,
contrary to this Convention; any fishing activities; the carrying out of research or survey activi-
ties; any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal state; and any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(2).
52. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(2)(h).
53. Maduro, supra note 37, at 79.
54. Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International
Lawmaking, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 60-65 (1980).
55. Id. at 63-65.
56. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(2)(1).
57. Reisman, supra note 54, at 63-65.
58. Id. at 65.
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The LOS Convention also limits the rights of the coastal states. The
prejudicial activity must occur in the territorial sea before the coastal
state can invoke its rights under the Convention. 59 This provision, cou-
pled with the adoption of a twelve-mile territorial sea, helps to avoid the
dangers inherent in more expansive interpretations of coastal state au-
thority.60 Article 24 of the LOS Convention imposes the additional re-
quirement that the coastal state shall not discriminate in form or in fact
against foreign ships based upon their nationality or destination. Fur-
thermore, they may not impose requirements on transiting ships which
have the "practical effect" of denying or impairing innocent passage.61 It
has been suggested that if passage is in fact innocent, states with transit-
ing ships may be expected to assert their right of passage against coastal
state claims of non-innocence. 62 In a major improvement over the 1958
Geneva Convention, compulsory adjudication is available to determine
non-innocence, at least where commercial vessels are involved. 63
A final consideration concerns Article 26, which states that charges
may not be levied upon foreign ships by reason of their passage through
the territorial sea alone, but that payment for specific services actually
rendered to the ship may be exacted. The implication that the costs of
maintenance and regulation of navigational aids and facilities will be
borne by coastal states may cast an inequitable burden on coastal states,
particularly the developing nations.64
B. Prescriptions Applicable to Merchant Ships and Government Ships
Operated for Commercial Purposes
Subsection B of the LOS Convention contains rules that apply only to
commercial vessels. The rules delineate the extent of the coastal state's
civil and criminal jurisdiction over these ships. Article 27 provides that
criminal jurisdiction generally should not be exercised on board a foreign
ship during its passage through the territorial sea. Among the few excep-
tions are situations when-the consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal state, when the assistance of the coastal state has been requested,
or when illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is involved. With only two excep-
tions, the Article provides that criminal jurisdiction should not be exer-
cised in connection with crimes committed before the ship's entry into
59. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 19(2); see Moore, The Regime of Straits and the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 118 (1980).
60. Moore, supra note 59, at 118.
61. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art 24; see Moore, supra note 59, at 118.
62. Moore, supra note 59, at 119.
63. Id.
64. Smith, supra note 21, at 503-04; see Burke, supra note 19, at 189-90.
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the territorial waters of the coastal state.65
Article 28 provides that the coastal state may not stop or divert a for-
eign ship passing through the territorial sea for the purpose of exercising
civil jurisdiction over a person on board. However, both Articles 27 and
28 specify that the coastal state may exert its criminal or civil jurisdiction
over a ship passing through territorial waters after the ship has left the
internal waters of the state.
66
The provisions of Subsection B attempt to accommodate the interests
of the coastal state in regulating those activities of vessels sailing within
its territorial waters that bear directly on its community values. Under
this formulation, the jurisdiction of the coastal state over criminal mat-
ters, which threaten greater deprivation to the coastal community, is
more expansive than its jurisdiction over civil wrongs. This competence
to prescribe and apply either criminal or civil sanctions is limited to
events having the most direct impact, that is, criminal events occurring
within territorial waters, and civil and criminal wrongs resulting from a
ship's passage through internal waters.67 Special concern for enforce-
ment in areas of narcotics traffic, pollution, and environmental problems
is evident, 68 in conformity with increasing demands for regulation over
these areas in recent years.
C. Prescriptions Applicable to Warships and Other Government Ships
Operated for Non-Commercial Purposes
Subsection C contains special prescriptions applicable to warships69
and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. Ar-
ticle 30 provides that warships, in exercising the right of innocent pas-
sage, must "comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state"
and may be required to leave the territorial sea immediately upon disre-
gard of a request for compliance. 70 Article 31 places liability on the flag
state for any loss or damage to the coastal state arising from the non-
compliance of a warship or other government ship operated for non-com-
mercial purposes while in the territorial sea. Finally, the principle of
immunity is reaffirmed in Article 32.
Western powers, including the United States, France, and Great Brit-
ain, traditionally have favored the unimpeded passage of warships, with
65. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 27(5).
66. Id. arts. 27(2) & 28(3).
67. Id. arts. 27(l)(a) & (b), 27(2), 28(3).
68. Id. arts. 27(1)(d) (narcotics traffic) & 27(5) (preservation of marine environment).
69. Defined in id. art. 29.
70. This formula resembles that of the 1958 Geneva Convention. See Shelton & Rose,
supra note 3, at 556.
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no requirement of notice on the part of the foreign vessel.71 The Soviet
Union and other Eastern Bloc nations, however, have argued that inno-
cent passage is not a right, but merely a matter of privilege or tolerance.
These nations claim that requirements of notice and authorization may
be imposed on transiting warships.72 Such a requirement may preclude
the effective use of innocent passage.73 Furthermore, where, as in the
U.S.S.R., all state-owned vessels are classified as warships, the state pre-
sumably could invoke the defenses and immunities attributable to war-
ships for all state-owned vessels, their crew, and passengers. 74
In recent years, however, the U.S.S.R. has gradually moved toward
unrestricted innocent passage, perhaps due to its emergence as a major
naval power.75 Nevertheless, though a majority of nations follow the
"Western" position regarding prior notice and authorization, 76 many
coastal states continue to demand compliance with notice and authoriza-
tion requirements. 77 Other states, which do not themselves require prior
notice, strongly endorse the practice.78 These demands generally have
been met through informal notification at low levels of authority.
79
However, it is possible that military confrontation could occur because of
adamant positions held by some of the more powerful states.
80
At the final session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, two
amendments to the proposed Convention were introduced, both of which
would have enabled a coastal state to require prior authorization or noti-
fication for passage by warships in the territorial sea.81 Although these
71. The United States, for example, recognizes a right of innocent passage for military
vessels. The U.S. requires no notice from foreign ships in its territorial waters, and gives no
notice when transiting the territorial waters of other states. Smith, supra note 21, at 513.
72. Comment, The Innocent Passage of Warships in Foreign Territorial Seas: A Threatened
Freedom, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 573, 578-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Innocent Passage].
73. Smith, supra note 21, at 515. The Soviet Union, for instance, requires that thirty days'
notice be given prior to passage by warships. Id.
74. Id. at 518.
75. Innocent Passage, supra note 72, at 600.
76. Smith, supra note 21, at 515.
77. Innocent Passage, supra note 72, at 582-83.
78. Id. at 584.
79. Id. at 582-83.
80. Id. at 583. One such confrontation did occur in August 1981, involving the United
States and Libya. During weapons exercises conducted in the south Mediterranean Sea by the
United States, two Libyan jets fired upon U.S. F-14 fighter planes; they were themselves shot
down sixty miles off the Libyan coast in the Gulf of Sidra. Libya claims a territorial sea of
twelve miles and, since 1973, has claimed the waters of the Gulf of Sidra where the military
exercises took place. Although no other nation, including the Soviet Union, recognizes Libya's
claim to the Gulf of Sidra, this incident illustrates the potential for military conflict arising
from unilateral claims and demands by coastal states. Shootout Over the Med, Time, Aug. 31,
1981, at 24-25.
81. U.N. Press Release, supra note 6, at 37.
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proposals ultimately were not pressed to a vote by their sponsors,8 2 the
lack of explicit codification probably will not alter the customary prac-
tices of these nations. Certain coastal states, opposed to the unimpeded
passage of warships, have adopted regulations such as demands for prior
notice of passage or "pollution" or "weight" controls,8 3 whose practical
effect is to restrict or deny passage. These types of regulations, which
would be cognizable under Article 21, coupled with the provision that
warships not in compliance with coastal state laws and regulations may
be required to leave the territorial sea,84 suggest that innocent passage, as
prescribed in the LOS Convention, could be undermined substantially by
the exclusive interests of coastal states.
Although Article 24 of the new treaty provides that the coastal state
"shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships" and, in particu-
lar, shall not "impose requirements. . . which have the practical effect
of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage, '85 the actual scope
of coastal state authority to prescribe and apply policy with respect to
warships remains unclear in light of customary practice. The failure of
the LOS Convention to address the issues of prior notice and authoriza-
tion requirements8 6 magnifies this uncertainty. Such ambiguities are no
doubt particularly disturbing to those maritime nations whose bases of
power depend on effective military use of the seas, and whose interests




Transit passage refers to navigation through straits which connect the
high seas. Since the 1958 Geneva Convention, navigation through such
straits has been regulated by the general provisions applicable to inno-
82. Id.
83. For example, Canada in 1970 attempted through internal legislation to subject 100
miles of coastal sea to "pollution control." Similarly, Malaysia and Indonesia have restricted
shipping in their territorial waters on the grounds of "pollution control." Under these restric-
tions, warships, due to their excessive weight, are to be excluded completely. Innocent Pas-
sage, supra note 72, at 586; see Smith, supra note 21, at 514-15. But see Contemporary Law,
supra note 19, at 222, stating that during the preparations for the Third Conference, "only two
proposals of over a dozen provided expressly that the coastal state could require authorization
and notification of the passage of warships" (citations omitted). The two proposals were made
by "straits states." Id.
84. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 30.
85. Id. art. 24(I)(a).
86. In commenting on the 1958 Geneva Convention, Smith has stated that "[a]lthough the
Convention does not authorize the coastal state to make passage of warships subject to previ-
ous authorization, neither does it forbid actions of this nature." Smith, supra note 21, at 515.
The statement is equally true with respect to the LOS Convention.
87. See, eg., PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 22, at 131.
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cent passage. 88 The subsequent recognition of a twelve-mile territorial
sea brought traditional territorial sea rights into conflict with free pas-
sage rights in more than 100 straits around the globe.
89
The maritime nations regard any restriction on the right of navigation
as gravely affecting their economic, political, and military interests.90
With the recognition of a twelve-mile territorial sea, the maritime states
became concerned that the straits states may be permitted to "close off"
straits used for international navigation by applying the doctrine of inno-
cent passage to supersede the existing navigation rights currently exer-
cised under the doctrine of freedom of the high seas.91
As a result of these developments, the United States formulated a new
policy with respect to ocean passage and presented its proposal at the
1971 summer session of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction.92 The proposal declared that the United States would ac-
cept the extension of territorial waters to twelve miles only if a treaty
could be negotiated which would provide for freedom of navigation
through and over international straits, as defined in the 1958 Geneva
Convention.93 Although the proposal provided that ships and aircraft
should enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight as they have
on the high seas, some limitations were envisaged, such as the right of a
coastal state to prescribe and enforce certain regulations and establish
88. 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 35, art. 16(4). "There shall be no suspension of
the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international naviga-
tion between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of
a foreign State."
89. Cundick, International Strait The Right ofAccess, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107
(1975). An unpublished survey conducted by the United States Navy Department, quoted in
McNees, supra note 1, at 185, revealed that if a twelve-mile territorial sea were adopted, "the
waters of over 116 major straits... would become part of the territorial waters of the coastal
states and there would no longer be the high seas corridor which currently gives an absolutely
unrestricted right of passage through them." The study further revealed that recognition of a
two hundred-mile limit would place virtually every passage between two free seas within the
territorial sea of some nation. Id. A similar study by the Department of State, reported in
Pirtle, Transit Rights and US. Security Interests in International Straits: The "Straits Debate"
Revisited, 5 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 477, 488 & n.29 (1978), identified 121 international
straits which would be brought under national jurisdiction by the adoption of a twelve-mile
territorial sea. Of these, 16 are designated as "straits of major importance": West Korean,
Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Ombai, West Bering, Juan De Fuca, Old Bahamas Channel, Domi-
nica Channel, Martinique Channel, St. Lucia Channel, St. Vincent Passage, Dover, Gibraltar,
Bab Al Mandeb, and Hormuz.
90. Grandison & Meyer, International Straits, Global Communications, and the Evolving
Law of the Sea, 8 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 393, 416-17 (1975).
91. Cundick, supra note 89, at 110; See McNees, supra note 1, at 184.
92. Robertson, supra note 43, at 806-07.
93. Id. at 808.
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suitable sea lanes.94 Nevertheless, the United States proposal was consid-
erably broader than the innocent passage codification of the 1958 Geneva
Convention.
95
In contrast to the concerns of the maritime states, the straits states are
concerned about the proximity and density of traffic in the straits on
which they border, and the possible effects of this traffic on their inter-
ests. They fear that pollution caused by accidents in adjacent straits will
endanger the lives of their citizens and damage property and resources.
Moreover, dense traffic in a strait may make it difficult or impossible for
coastal states to utilize fully their fisheries and seabed resources.
96
Coastal states are also concerned that traffic in straits adjacent to their
shores may jeopardize their security interests. Such concerns stem from
fears of attack, infiltration, or military intelligence activities conducted
by vessels and aircraft passing through the straits.97 As a final considera-
tion, coastal states recognize the potential strategic value of straits, and
some may attempt to manipulate the right to navigate international
straits as a source of wealth or a means of achieving particular political
objectives.9
Although certain straits states have adopted more extreme positions
which attempt to justify their competence to limit access based upon no-
tions of "national sovereignty," 99 most straits states have recognized that
the maritime states have legitimate interests in transit passage. In re-
sponse to the United States proposal, Fiji, together with a group of straits
states, proposed the continuation of the non-suspendable innocent pas-
sage principle of the 1958 Convention, modified to some extent to meet
the objections of the maritime states. Neither proposal, however, proved
satisfactory. 00
In the ongoing dialogue in the Seabed Committee and the Third Law
of the Sea Conference, the United Kingdom introduced the concept of
"transit passage" through straits that are used for international naviga-
tion and that join two parts of the high seas. 10 1 This was an attempt to
find a middle ground between the freedom of navigation proposals fa-
vored by the maritime nations and the proposals of the straits nations
which would have been mere extensions of the concept of innocent pas-
94. Id. at 809.
95. Id. at 812;see also supra note 83.
96. Grandison & Meyer, supra note 90, at 420.
97. Id. at 421.
98. Id. at 422.
99. Cundick, supra note 89, at 109-10.
100. Robertson, supra note 43, at 817-18.
101. Id. at 819.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
sage.102 The "transit passage" concept became the basis of Part III of the
LOS Convention.
103
The definition of straits is set forth in Article 37. Straits are defined as
waterways "used for international navigation between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone." This definition is qualified by Article
38.104 Like its predecessor in the 1958 Geneva Convention, Article 38
mandates that in order for a body of water to be characterized as a strait
subject to the regime of transit passage, it must be a bridge between high
seas and/or exclusive economic zones and must in fact be used for inter-
,national navigation. 10 5 Article 36 provides that if there is a strip of high
seas or exclusive economic zone through a strait, and if navigation within
that strip is as convenient as navigation through the territorial seas por-
tions of the strait, then the ship or aircraft must avoid the territorial sea
and remain in the high seas or exclusive economic zone portion. This
provision has a restrictive effect because, depending upon the interpreta-
tion of the word "convenience," vessels might be forced to extend their
voyages or to operate without coastal navigational aids.
106
Another significant aspect of this definition is its omission of straits
joining a part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone to a nation's
territorial sea. Instead, the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage
in Article 45 applies to such straits.
10 7
Articles 38 through 40 establish the rights and correlative duties of
ships and aircraft under the transit passage provisions. Article 38 sets
forth the substantive content of the right of transit passage; it is explicit
in providing that transit passage "shall not be impeded." This provision
apparently supplies the basic guarantee of freedom of navigation sought
by maritime nations. Article 38 does not say that the coastal state may
not "interrupt" passage, but the usual construction of the word "im-
pede" suggests that any action that interrupts passage also impedes it. 108
Moreover, the LOS Convention ensures non-discrimination against ships
and aircraft based on destination, flag, type of vessel, or cargo. The Arti-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 826.
104. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 38.
105. Reisman, supra note 54, at 66.
106. Robertson, supra note 43, at 828.
107. Id. at 830. The economic zone is "an area of the high seas subject to the exercise of
certain coastal State rights, including sovereign rights to the living and non-living resources of
the area and the necessary ancillary exclusive jurisdiction to protect those rights." Id. at 829.
The criterion that the straits be "used for international navigation" has also been criticized for
its ambiguity. See Reisman, supra note 54, at 66.
108. Robertson, supra note 43, at 837.
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cle 38(1) grant of transit passage to "all" ships and aircraft appears to be
so inclusive as to embrace vessels of any type or nationality.10 9
Not all scholars, however, are satisfied that Article 38 adequately pro-
vides for unhampered passage through international straits. One writer
questions the efficacy of the provision because it is not specific in granting
rights which would make the regime acceptable from a security stand-
point, and so must be construed as permitting the coastal states to exer-
cise broad discretion. 110
Article 39 sets forth the duties of ships and aircraft exercising the right
of transit passage. It provides that a vessel must proceed without delay,
must not threaten or use force against the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, or political independence of states bordering straits, and must not
violate any of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations.
This provision has been criticized because the legal duties provide cri-
teria that are subject to the coastal states' evaluation and approval.
Thus, transit passage is made to appear more as "a species of innocent
passage than a high seas freedom." ''
Even if transit passage affords users significantly greater surface navi-
gation rights than does innocent passage, an important issue, apparently
left open by the LOS Convention, is whether transit rights permit sub-
merged submarines to traverse straits.112 No explicit textual provision
recognizes a right of submerged transit for submarines. Article 39(1)(c)
merely states that ships in transit shall refrain from any activities other
than those incident to their normal mode of continuous and expeditious
passage. Whatever is normal to the mode of passage for a particular
vehicle, presumably, is permitted. 113
Scholars are divided as to whether Article 39 secures the right of sub-
marines to navigate below the surface. Those who affirm a right of sub-
merged passage point to the explicit requirement imposed by Article 20
that submarines exercising the right of innocent passage operate on the
surface, and they suggest that the omission of a similar provision from
the articles dealing with transit passage is not the result of mere inadver-
109. Id. at 838.
110. Reisman, supra note 54, at 69. But see Pirtle, supra note 89, at 486 (favoring the
current transit passage provisions and believing that they "constitute a treaty weighted in favor
of the navigation and security interests of the United States").
111. Reisman, supra note 54, at 70.
112. Id. at 71. As noted previously, under the regime of innocent passage, no right of
submerged transit is accorded submarines. See Robertson supra note 43.
113. Robertson, supra note 43, at 843.
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tence.114 One such writer notes that with regard to the high seas portion
of the Convention:
It has never been contended that the "freedom of navigation" confirmed by
article 87. . .does not include the right of submerged navigation for sub-
marines. Yet there is no provision in part VII which explicitly confers that
right on submarines.' 15
Other writers have rejected this view, arguing that, despite the reason-
ableness of inferring a right of submerged passage from the absence of its
prohibition in Article 39, the opposite inference is also possible, espe-
cially because such a right would be a "derogation from sovereignty" of
the coastal state and thus should have been granted explicitly. 116
An interpretation of Article 39 permitting submerged transit through
straits gives rise to internal contradictions. For example, Article 39(l)(b)
recognizes the coastal state's competence to appraise the contemplated
passage for its conformity with the principles of international law set
forth in the United Nations Charter. If submerged passage is secret pas-
sage, it is unclear how the coastal state can perform that function under
subsection (b). It can be argued that the section appears to be more
coherent "if no right of submerged passage is hypothesized."1 17
Article 40 of the LOS Convention prohibits ships, including marine
research and hydrographic survey ships, from carrying out any research
or survey activities during transit passage without the prior permission of
bordering states. The propriety of its inclusion and the language of its
provisions appear largely uncontested. 18
Articles 41, 42, and 44 establish the rights and duties of coastal states
with regard to transit passage through international straits. Article 41
limits that right to the designation of sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes. Article 42 empowers coastal states to prevent, reduce, and con-
trol pollution, prohibit fishing, and regulate the loading and unloading of
commodities, currency, or persons in contravention of customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary regulations.
Although the two articles are relatively narrow in scope, they seem to
grant coastal states sufficient latitude to interfere substantially with tran-
siting ships.119 One safeguard which attempts to prevent such
interference is the requirement that coastal state regulations be consistent
114. Id. at 844.
115. Id. See also Submerged Passage, supra note 31, at 200-20.
116. Reisman, supra note 54, at 71.
117. Id. at 73.
118. See Robertson, supra note 43, at 832.
119. Id. at 849.
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with international standards. Article 41 permits nations bordering straits
to prescribe sea lanes or traffic separation schemes only after they have
received the approval of the "competent international organization." 120
Article 42 similarly restricts the power of the coastal state regarding the
discharge of "oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the
strait" 121 by permitting it to give effect only to applicable international
regulations. In cases of fishing, customs, fiscal, immigration, and sani-
tary regulations, where the discretion of the coastal state is not limited by
an international standard, Article 42(2) requires that laws and regula-
tions not discriminate among foreign ships or "in their application have
the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of
transit passage."
As previously noted, straits linking the high seas or an exclusive eco-
nomic zone with the territorial sea of a foreign state are not covered by
the transit passage provisions. 122 Similarly, straits between an island and
the mainland are excluded if a high seas or exclusive economic zone
route of similar convenience exists. 123 Article 45 fills the gap in coverage
for these two types of straits by providing that the doctrine of non-sus-
pendable innocent passage will apply.
Conclusion
Although the rights of innocent passage and transit passage, as codi-
fied in the LOS Convention, generally appear to accommodate maritime
and coastal interests and the needs of the larger community, 124 some pro-
visions of the articles do present problems. Most of these problems arise
from ambiguities in the language or application of the provisions, which
could be exploited in favor of the more exclusive interests of coastal
states. 125
For example, the new definition of "innocent passage" in Article 19
gives the coastal states broad latitude to characterize passage as non-in-
nocent through the use of subjective criteria. Moreover, although the
new provisions in Article 21 contain grants of authority to the coastal
state to regulate innocent passage in areas that would appear to fall well
120. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 41(4).
121. Id. art. 42(l)(b).
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 557. President Reagan has declared that the naviga-
tion and overflight provisions, along with most other provisions of the LOS Convention, were
acceptable to the United States and "served well the interests of all nations." Oxman, The New
Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A. 1. 156, 157 (1983).
125. See Smith, supra note 21, at 542.
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within the jurisdiction of that coastal state, such as pollution and weight
control, these provisions, in practice, have the potential to result in exclu-
sive claims and prescriptions by the coastal state to suspend, deny, or
impede the innocent passage of certain types of vessels, particularly war-
ships. Furthermore, the issue of coastal state claims requiring prior no-
tice and authorization for the passage of warships through territorial
waters is not clarified in the Convention. As has been observed,
"[m]ilitary and commercial activities may be as effectively discouraged
when rights are uncertain and ambiguous as when there are no legal
rights."1
26
Similarly, with respect to transit passage, some prescriptions, particu-
larly those dealing with the right of submerged transit, were never codi-
fied and are completely missing from the LOS Convention. Even where
prescriptions have been set forth expressly in the articles, the application
of those prescriptions frequently is made to depend upon the interpreta-
tion given those articles by the coastal nations. Coastal states, for exam-
ple, are granted by Article 39 the competence to determine whether a
purported transit through straits constitutes a "threat or use of force"
against their "sovereignty, territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence." 127 Such a grant of competence is broad indeed, and it may work
to the detriment of the interests of the maritime nations. A more satis-
factory provision might set forth some objective criteria for use by
coastal states in evaluating the prejudicial nature of a particular transit.
Thus, although the LOS Convention provisions regarding innocent
passage and transit passage do promote, in some measure, unimpeded
access to the territorial seas and straits, certain ambiguities remain and
ultimately may undermine a policy of inclusive oceans usage.
The new Law of the Sea Convention was approved by a recorded vote
of 130 in favor to 4 against, with 17 abstentions. 128 The ratification of
sixty states will be required within a two-year period for the agreement to
enter into force.1 29 No reservations or exceptions to the Convention are
permitted,130 thus precluding states from selective ratification. Nations
126. Moore, supra note 59, at 82.
127. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 39(1)(b).
128. U.N. Press Release, supra note 6, at 9-10. The recorded vote was requested by the
United States. Id. at 9.
129. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 305(2) & 308(1). The Convention will remain
open for signature until December 9, 1984. Id. art. 305(2). To be more precise, however, all
states and "other entities referred to in article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d) and (e)" are allowed
to ratify the Convention. Id. art. 306. Such "entities" include various national liberation
movements, governments that are not fully independent, and Namibia. Id. art. 305. See U.N.
Press Release, supra note 6, at 44-48.
130. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 309.
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not assenting to the treaty nevertheless remain subject to existing interna-
tional law,13' including customary law.
At present, nine states, primarily from the Third World, have ratified
the LOS Convention. 132 However, the United States, which was among
those voting against its approval, thus far has refused to sign the Law of
the Sea treaty. This decision stems from United States objection to the
deep seabed mining provisions in Part XI of the Convention, which were
perceived as "unacceptable and damaging to the United States and other
countries' interests."'
133
The process by which international law is made and applied incorpo-
rates global community expectations of authority and control. 34 A
United States refusal to accept the obligations of a new Convention un-
doubtedly would affect perceptions regarding its acceptability among
other nations. 135 The United States stance may "give rise to political re-
straints on ratification by major allies, as well as misgivings of principle
regarding the entry into force of a treaty that, without the world's major
power, cannot purport to establish a global regime."'
136
Nevertheless, there is a substantial likelihood that the necessary sixty
states will ratify the Convention, thus bringing it into force.137 The wide-
spread support for the Convention evident in the recorded vote is partic-
ularly strong among coastal and straits states and less developed nations.
The Soviet Union is said to be a "strong proponent" of the Law of the
Sea pact, although it abstained from voting for approval. 38 There re-
mains, however, some concern for the controlling effect that will be given
to the provisions on oceans passage if the treaty is ratified over the objec-
tions of several important maritime nations, including the United States.
Even in the absence of formal ratification, the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion is an important source of authoritative communication with respect
to current maritime law.' 39 With the exception of certain controversial
areas such as deep seabed mining and settlement of disputes, the provi-
sions of the Convention already are regarded by some as definitive state-
131. Id. art. 317(3).
132. They are the Bahamas, Belize, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, the United Na-
tions Council for Namibia, and Zambia 14 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 144, 144-147 (1984).
133. United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release U/SUN 1-(83) (Jan. 3,
1983) at 2.
134. See McDougal, supra note 14, at 46.
135. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth
Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1982).
136. Id.
137. Oxman, supra note 124, at 156.
138. Bus. Wk, Mar. 14, 1983, at 159.
139. Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 557.
407
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
ments of existing customary law, applicable to all states irrespective of
their ratification of the document. 140 Claims to a territorial sea of twelve
miles, for example, invariably would be recognized under present cus-
tomary international law, and states claiming less than twelve miles may
be expected to extend their jurisdictional limits accordingly.
14 1
The provisions regarding innocent passage and transit passage are the
product of years of negotiation and compromise between inclusive and
exclusive interests of global participants. 142 The absence of a formal
treaty is unlikely to alter the pattern of expectations and preferences
which gave effect to this compromise. The advantage lost, however,
would be the certainty of a detailed and binding agreement to which par-
ties may resort to settle their disputes.
143
140. Oxman, supra note 124, at 156.
141. H. KNIGHT, CONSEQUENCES OF NON-AGREEMENT AT THE THIRD U.N. LAW OF
THE SEA CONFERENCE 17, 48 (1976).
142. Shelton & Rose, supra note 3, at 557.
143. H. KNIGHT, supra note 141, at 6.
Vol. 9:389, 1983
